Public economics, political economics, behavioural economics c[dot]de-meulenaer[at]lse.ac.ukcopy
/klo-eh duh mö-luh-nar/
I'm a PhD student in economics at the London School of Economics. My research lies at the intersection of public, behavioural, and political economics. I use custom surveys to explore the formation of policy preferences towards inequality reduction, and the mechanisms underlying those preferences.
I am especially interested in understanding the disconnect between the policies that economists identify as optimal, the policies that citizens support, and the policies that governments implement.
What types of arguments are used to support redistribution, and which are most persuasive to listeners? Using natural language processing and the complete databases of U.S. Congressional and Norwegian parliamentary speeches from 2015 to 2022, we contrast fairness-based arguments with those emphasizing adverse societal consequences of inequality(“inequality externalities”). Although fairness arguments are more common in both settings, inequality externality arguments are, relatively speaking, 224% more common in the Norwegian Storting than in the U.S. Congress. We document that fairness arguments are more divisive and operate through emotions, while externality arguments are more likely to appeal to logic while seeking consensus. In a survey experiment, fairness-based arguments elicit greater outrage but are not, on average, significantly more persuasive. We find evidence of an educational divide, however, as fairness arguments are more persuasive among less-educated respondents, whereas legislators representing more highly educated districts tend to favor externality arguments. We suggest that, for a given level of development, greater inequality is associated with more fairness arguments.
Attitudes towards the inheritance tax and demand for redistribution(working paper on request)
I use new survey data from France to explore attitudes towards the inheritance tax and demand for redistribution. Although the inheritance tax is very unpopular, respondents show significant support for redistributive forms of taxation, namely for taxing capital income and the bequests of parents who have themselves inherited. I also find that a large share of the variation in support for the inheritance tax is explained by whether participants believe that taxes mostly enhance fairness or harm the economy. This suggests that some respondents' apparently low demand for redistribution may stem from their lack of trust in the power of taxes to effectively redistribute. I then analyze how these preferences shift when exposed to two arguments: one highlighting wealth inequality, the other defending parents' right to bequeath their hard-earned savings. The inequality argument increases support for the inheritance and capital income taxes. Surprisingly, the second argument also increases support for the capital income tax and mildly increases support for the inheritance tax. I interpret this last finding as evidence of backfiring, echoing the strong political polarization on the topic of the inheritance tax.
Work in progress
What's in it for me? Attitudes, beliefs, and support for economic policies
Demand for redistribution is typically modelled as a single variable, such as support for progressive taxation, driven by individual attitudes and social preferences. I propose an alternative framework, where support for specific policies also depends on beliefs about their incidence and macroeconomic effects. Using a custom survey conducted in France covering twelve predistributive, tax, and spending policies, I find that those beliefs alone explain 26% of the variation in policy support, and have more explanatory power than any other variable. Perceived personal benefit emerges as the strongest predictor, followed by perceived impact on growth, and benefit to low-income workers. Left- and right-leaning respondents broadly agree on what constitutes a good policy, but diverge in their beliefs: differences in perceived personal benefit and impact on growth account for 40% of the partisan gap. Benchmarking against empirical estimates, I find that left-leaning respondents are correct on average, while right-leaning respondents underestimate policies' benefits. Gaps in those beliefs also explain why some individuals prefer predistributive to redistributive policies. Finally, treatments providing information about policies' effects increase support on average, and decrease polarisation.
Perceptions of tax evasion and tax enforcement with Daniel Reck
